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1. Fuzzy scope 
 
a. Ratione personae | privacy enforcement authorities 
 
The scope of the Arrangement ratione personae is limited to ‘privacy enforcement authorities’ 
(PEA’s). Such PEA is defined (under Section 1: ‘Definitions’) as “any public body that has as one of its 
responsibilities the enforcement of a privacy and/or data protection law, and that  has  powers  to 
conduct investigations or take enforcement action”. In a footnote, both in the preamble and under 
Section 1 (‘Definitions’), it is further clarified that whichever DPA qualifies as a PEA.  
 
There are several problems with this definition and consequently with the demarcation ratione per-
sonae of the Arrangement: 
 
- a body may qualify as a PEA even if having no power to take enforcement action itself, as long as 
it has the power to conduct investigations; this is reinforced by the addition that whichever DPA 
(irrespective of its nature and competencies) qualifies as a PEA 
 
- no purpose distinction whatsoever is being made between administrative, civil or penal investiga-
tion/enforcement powers, which constitutes a flagrant denial of the purpose limitation principle 
 
- moreover, a possible cross-over between the various abovementioned spheres (by information 
sharing and exchange as promoted by the Arrangement) raises serious concerns, especially as re-
gards: 
 
- the impact on suspects’ procedural rights: the non-granting of procedural rights proper that 
normally accrue to suspects or defendants in criminal matters in the requesting jurisdiction may 
easily prompt the non-usability of information or evidence gathered by a requested PEA that, 
even though complying in full with its own domestic data protection legal framework, has not 
granted such rights (e.g. a duty for the person under investigation to cooperate with an inves-
tigating PEA may well come down to a violation of the so called nemo tenetur principle) 
 
- the adverse effect on viable later enforcement (e.g. prosecution) by traditional competent au-
thorities for the same facts (possible administrative-penal ne bis in idem effects, impossibility 
to use evidence in criminal matters that was gathered by PEA’s having administrative investi-
gation/enforcement powers only, etc.) 
 
b. Ratione materiae | enforcement cooperation/coordination and related activities/assistance 
 
‘Enforcement cooperation’ (PEA’s “working together”) and ‘enforcement coordination’ (i.e. when 
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PEA’s “link their enforcement activities […] in their respective jurisdictions”) are defined (under Sec-
tion 1: ‘Definitions’) in an strikingly vague, actually non-defining fashion. 
 
It further appears (from the preamble) that various activities are comprised under ‘enforcement co-
operation’: “sharing best practice, internet sweeps, co-ordinated investigations, or joint enforcement 
actions leading to penalties/sanctions”. Apart from the fact that the preamble is not the place to 
define the activities that qualify as enforcement cooperation and that no clarity exists as to whether 
the listed activities are limitative or merely exemplary, especially the mention of “joint enforcement 
actions leading to penalties/sanctions” raises concerns. It is unclear whether this goes beyond ‘en-
forcement coordination’ (as defined under Section 1: ‘Definitions’, and further clarified under Section 
8: ‘Coordination principles’) (not any longer from their respective jurisdictions?), whether the “pen-
alties/sanctions” are administrative, civil or penal in nature (supra, under 1.b, as well as para 60.21 of 
the explanatory report to Convention 108) and whether PEA’s need to have such penalizing/sanction-
ing power themselves (if yes, this contradicts the ‘open’ definition of PEA above; if no, the question 
arises whether PEA’s not having such power have the ability altogether to conduct such “joint en-
forcement actions”). 
 
2. Convention 108 
 
The preamble recalls “the provisions of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (‘Convention 108’), specifically those 
under Chapter IV on mutual assistance”. Also the eligibility criteria (under Section 12, ii.a) refer to Con-
vention 108 as a criterion for possible partnership under the Arrangement. 
 
Above all, it seems key to recall that at least Council of Europe DPA’s are legally bound by Convention 
108. Obviously, the Arrangement, which is just an MoU between PEA’s, essentially governed by the Ex-
ecutive Committee of the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
(ICDPPC), acting as a depository with certain executive powers as regards membership etc. (under Section 
13)), has no legal force whatsoever (which the Arrangement itself confirms under Section 4: ‘Nature of 
the Arrangement’) and can surely not alter or divert from binding international law instruments, such as 
Convention 108. 
 
In several instances, however, the text of the Arrangement conflicts with Convention 108, which of course 
undermines the very potential of the Arrangement itself: 
 
a. by not respecting the administrative cooperation nature of Convention 108 
 
Chapter IV of Convention (mutual assistance) allows for administrative cooperation only. The explan-
atory report (para 71) is explicit on the matter: “The main provisions of this chapter are based on the 
two recent European conventions relating to mutual assistance in administrative matters […]”. The 
CoE keeps administrative cooperation conventions systemically separate from cooperation conven-
tions in criminal matters, both on the level of mother conventions or thematic conventions. The rea-
sons therefore are obvious, and have also to do with purpose limitation as a core data protection 
issue.2 
                                                          
1 “In keeping with the non self-executing character of the convention, it should be left to each State to determine 
the nature of these sanctions and remedies (civil, administrative, criminal)”. 
2 See e.g. the CoE Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. Para 225 of the explanatory 
report prohibits that “normally, information […] be used for other [than administrative] purposes except by arrang-
ing, if this were possible under the laws of the supplying State, for it to be provided under an instrument specially 
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By denying the administrative cooperation nature of Convention 108, the Arrangement can hardly be 
entered into by PEA’s from jurisdictions that are bound by Convention 108. It seems, therefore, that the 
Arrangement should either be limited to PEA’s having administrative investigation/enforcement compe-
tencies only, or should provide adequate safeguards to make sure that, as from the moment penal/crim-
inal investigations or enforcement may be envisaged or triggered by a cooperating PEA, a convention 
basis proper for cooperation in criminal matters is used.  
 
b. by denying the need for a legal basis for cooperation in either international or domestic law 
 
(Most) CoE DPA’s/PEA’s have no other lawful cross-border cooperation basis than Chapter IV of Conven-
tion 108, unless their domestic law autonomously provides such basis. It seems that the latter is not the 
case for at least the (vast) majority of CoE jurisdictions.3  
 
c. by allowing/promoting the sharing between PEA’s of personal data 
 
The Arrangement envisages to allow/promote the exchange and sharing of personal data between 
PEA’s. This becomes clear from: 
 
- the preambule: “information […] which may or may not include personal data” 
 
- Section 7: ‘Respecting privacy and data protection principles’, leaving it to PEA’s themselves to assess 
the necessity and proportionality of exchanging personal data (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?), whilst 
at the same time recognizing that some PEA’s may require more specific data protection safeguards 
(as allegedly provided in Schedule One, to which PEA’s may choose to opt-in) 
 
- Schedule One, which essentially has been drafted for the sole purpose of enabling personal data ex-
change and sharing 
 
Article 13, under 3.b of Convention 108 is quite explicit in prohibiting the exchange between DPA’s of 
personal data: “An authority designated by a Party shall at the request of an authority designated by 
another Party take, in conformity with its domestic law and for the sole purpose of protection of privacy, 
all appropriate measures for furnishing factual information relating to specific automatic processing car-
ried out in its territory, with the exception however of the personal data being processed.” The explana-
tory report (para 76) adds: “With regard to factual information, paragraph 3.b specifies that States may 
not reveal to each other the contents of data contained in data files. This provision is an obvious data 
protection safeguard for the protection of the privacy of the people concerned”. 
 
Consequently, it seems that all DPA’s bound by Convention 108 cannot lawfully enter into the Arrange-
ment, not even where their domestic law would create an autonomous legal basis for the exchange of 
personal data with DPA’s abroad. In order to serve the purpose of enforcement cooperation, it is advised 
therefore to limit any exchange of information under the Arrangement to non-personal data. That will 
                                                          
designed for such other purposes (for example, a treaty concerning mutual assistance in judicial matters such as the 
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS No. 30)”. Para 266 continues: “It is, in principle, 
conceivable that the use of information for purposes other than those stated in the Convention could lead to a 
breach of privacy and clash with the 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (ETS No.108)”. 
3 Even at EU level, Article 28.6, 2nd paragraph, of Directive 95/46 requires transposition into domestic law. 
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still allow for best practice exchange, coordinated internet sweep actions and mutual administrative as-
sistance relating to both legal or factual information in the sense of Article 13 of Convention 108. 
 
3. Adequacy requirement in cross-border relations 
 
Under (1), 2nd paragraph, Schedule One duly recognizes that it “does not, however, preclude circum-
stances where privacy and data protection laws of a Participant require further safeguards to be agreed 
between Participants in advance of any sharing of personal data”. Whilst in previous versions of the 
Arrangement/Schedule one (including version 14, which was submitted to the 36th ICDPPC), there was a 
reference in footnote 3 to the specific obstacles for EU member states to exchange information with 3rd 
states having no (proven) adequate data protection regime, the omission of the concerned footnote does 
not exempt EU member states from the prohibition to exchange personal data with such states. Moreo-
ver, the suggested ‘solution’ in the footnote concerned,4 to rely on “standard contractual clauses […] to 
frame transfers of personal data between a Participant rom the EU and a Participant subject to a law and 
conditions in its country that have not been subject to a positive adequacy finding”, is to simple a sugges-
tion. While it is correct that Article 26, under 2, in fine of Directive 95/46 recognizes that sufficient guar-
antees may derive from “adequate contractual clauses”, which may enable a “member state” to set the 
non-adequacy of a 3rd state’s data protection regime aside, Directive 95/46 does not sort direct effect, 
but requires transposition into domestic law instead. Looking at e.g. the Belgian domestic law, it is up to 
the Government (as the representative under international law of the Belgium as an EU “member state”, 
after advice of the Belgian DPA), to possibly allow a transfer based on sufficient guarantees derived from 
adequate contractual clauses. It is anticipated that most EU domestic data protection laws, like the Bel-
gian law and in full conformity with Directive 95/46, will not allow their DPA to assess autonomously 
whether contractual clauses will be sufficient to allow for personal data transfers to PEA’s from non-
adequate jurisdictions, but will at least require a government decision instead. It does not seem, there-
fore, that the adequacy hurdle can be easily overcome in the context of ad hoc needs to exchange/share 
personal data between PEA’s. This problem is all the more a reason to strictly limit the scope of the Ar-
rangement to the exchange of non-personal data (which is a necessity in light of Article 13, under 3.b of 
Convention 108 in any event; supra, under 2.c). 
 
4. Schedule One 
 
From a subsidiary perspective (since Schedule One envisages personal data exchange/sharing, it ought to 
be deleted altogether in order to enable CoE jurisdictions to join the Arrangement), the following remarks 
are formulated as regards a number of other specific provisions contained in Schedule One: 
 
a. Under (1) (iv) it is stated that PEA’s should “not make a request for assistance to another Participant 
on behalf of a complainant without the complainant's express consent”. At least for all PEA’s from 
jurisdiction bound by Convention 108, this is a mandatory restriction following from Article 15.3 of the 
latter Convention: “In no case may a designated authority be allowed to make under Article 14, para-
graph 2, a request for assistance on behalf of a data subject resident abroad, of its own accord and 
without the express consent of the person concerned”. It seems inopportune, therefore, to include this 
guarantee in the optional Schedule One. 
 
                                                          
4 Which read as follows: “For example, for the European Union Participants, where binding agreements for trans-
fer are required, the standard contractual clauses provide one option to frame transfers of personal data between 
a Participant rom the EU and a Participant subject to a law and conditions in its country that have not been subject 
to a positive adequacy finding”. 
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b. Under (1) (vi) […] PEA’s must “ensure that where sensitive personal data are being shared and fur-
ther processed, additional safeguards are put in place, such as the requirement that the data sub-
jects give their explicit consent”. Since it remains fairly doubtful that domestic laws will allow for the 
processing of sensitive data by DPA’s in the first place, this clause is deemed inappropriate. 
 
c. Under (1) (viii) DPA’s must “ensure that any entity to which the receiving participant makes an onward 
transfer of personal data is also subject to the above safeguards”. Not only is it unclear whether the 
“above” safeguards refer back to these meant under (1) (vii) only (technical and organizational security 
measures) or to all preceding safeguards ((1) (i-vii)), the exact reasons or purposes of any “onward 
transfer”, if allowed altogether, should clearly feature in the Arrangement.  
 
d. Under (1) (ix) PEA’s must “ensure that, where a Participant receives an application from a third party 
(such as an individual, judicial body or other law enforcement agency) for the disclosure of personal 
data received from another Participant”, the receiving Participant does whatever is in its power to not 
disclose the information received, seek the consent of the providing Participant or inform the latter if 
disclosure is mandatory under its laws. This clauses roughly mirrors Section 6.1 (iv) of the Arrangement 
itself, be it that the latter Section deals with confidential information (not necessarily personal infor-
mation). In cases where the third party is a judicial body or law enforcement agency, it is hard to un-
derstand why the Arrangement and Schedule One equally promote cross-border information ex-
change/sharing between PEA’s rather than domestic information sharing/exchange with the regular 
authorities competent for enforcement. Quis custodiet … 
 
e. Under 1 (x) PEA’s must “ensure mechanisms for supervising compliance with these safeguards and 
providing appropriate redress to data subjects in case of non-compliance”. Is this really to be under-
stood as if DPA’s/PEA’s are to provide independent oversight by a super-DPA? Many states where that 
exists and that will be capable therefore of opting in into Schedule One? According to oral replies to 
this question during the 36th ICDPPC, such supervisory task would be taken up by the Executive Com-
mittee (sic). Supervision and independent compliance monitoring of DPA’s/PEA’s by private persons in 
the executive committee of a conference, seriously? Quis custodiet … 
 
 
